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Three issues regarding asset prices and monetary policy are clarified. First, increases in 
asset prices due to monetary expansion, despite their “paper” wealth nature, tend to make 
current consumers as a whole wealthier. Second, the weaker (stronger) effect of monetary 
policy on investment through the Tobin’s q effect is, the stronger (weaker) monetary 
effect on consumption through the wealth effect. Third, from the perspective of 
macroeconomic stability, the soundness of asset market performances does not depend on 
whether they are fundamental or not, but on their compatibility with the AD-AS balance 
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1.  Introduction 
The impressive stock market booms in the United States (U.S.) during the 1990s have 
attracted public, policy as well as academic attention to the relationship between asset 
prices and monetary policy. As stock prices kept skyrocketing and consumption booms 
made the already low personal saving rate plummet further during the end of the decade, 
the U.S. monetary authorities (the Fed) were concerned that the so-called “wealth effect” 
could jeopardize the balance between aggregate demand and supply (Greenspan, 2000a, 
b). Accordingly, the  Fed adopted preemptive monetary tightening by raising the Fed 
Funds rate for six times from mid-1999 to mid-2000, despite no obvious signs of 
imminent inflation. The preemptive tightening was questioned by many observers in 
financial communities, who did not share the Fed’s concerns over the wealth effect and 
argued that the Fed should not interfere with the stock market booms that are 
fundamentally driven by the underlying productivity growth in a “New Economy”. The 
Fed responded by frequently stressing that the motive of the tightening  was not to 
interfere with the stock markets per se but to prevent an imbalance between aggregate 
demand (AD) and supply (AS), existing or potential.  
Against this backdrop, there are burgeoning empirical studies in the literature on how 
asset prices affect consumption through the wealth effect (Poterba, 2000; Dynan and 
Maki, 2001; Maki and Palumbo, 2001; among others).  Research interest has also been 
rekindled to investigate the wealth effect of monetary policy (Ludvigson, Steindel and 
Lettau, 2002). There are also intensive debates among academia and policymakers on 
whether monetary authorities should respond to asset price movements (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1999, 2001; Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani, 2000; among others).   - 3 - 
Observing current discussions regarding asset prices and monetary policy, we find 
three fundamental issues, which have seemingly straightforward explanation, require 
clarification. 
The first issue is regarding the wealth effect (on consumption) of monetary policy. It 
seems straightforward that monetary expansion,
1 by lowering the interest rate and hence 
increasing asset prices, tends to increase the wealth of consumers, who will accordingly 
increase their consumption. However, as argued by Gramlich (2001), if increases in asset 
prices are not due to increases in future incomes but because of a decline in the discount 
factor, “households are not expecting higher future returns but are simply discounting the 
same stream of returns at a different rate, so it is less clear that they are truly better off 
and should increase their consumption”. In a word, Gramlich wonders how “paper 
wealth” changes induced by monetary policy affect consumption.  
The term “paper wealth (change)” is often used to describe changes in asset value for 
reasons other than changes in the asset’s underlying productivities; e.g., asset bubbles can 
cause paper wealth increases. Since asset value variations caused by monetary policy are 
usually not taken as bubbles but as fundamental asset revaluations due to changes in the 
interest rate, we will call them “fundamental paper wealth” (FPW) changes. A conjecture 
is that, if FPW changes were merely changes in the metric of wealth, the aforementioned 
Fed’s preemptive tightening might not have caused much opposition.  
The second issue is regarding how monetary policy affects asset prices. According to 
the widely used present value (PV) rule for asset price determination, it seems 
straightforward that monetary expansion will increase asset prices by decreasing the 
                                                 
1 To fix idea, we may discuss only the effects of monetary expansion; and those of monetary tightening are 
presumably the opposite.    - 4 - 
interest rate as the discount factor in the denominators. However, since the decreased 
interest rate could increase investments and hence lower capital incomes, would not the 
numerators in the PV rule also tend to decrease? If so, monetary effect on asset prices is 
not as clear as it is commonly thought; nor is the wealth effect of monetary policy.  
The third issue is regarding the concept and determination of fundamental asset 
prices. A common view holds that monetary authorities should not interfere with asset 
price movements driven by fundamentals. Based on this view, many observers argue 
against monetary responses to asset price movements on the ground that monetary 
authorities cannot distinguish between asset price movements driven by fundamentals 
and those not. However, conceptually, what kinds of asset price movements are 
fundamental; and what other kinds are misalignments? According to the PV rule, 
fundamental asset prices should reflect assets’ underlying (risk-adjusted) yields—higher 
asset prices due to higher yields are fundamental, while those due to “irrational 
exuberance” are bubbles. Yet, given yields, asset prices also depend on how the yields 
are discounted. Then, what  interest rate level is the “fundamental” discount factor? 
Would not changes in fundamentals tend to also alter the fundamental interest rate? If so, 
would not monetary responses be needed to accommodate the changes in the underlying 
interest rate?  
The above questions, once raised, have self-evident answers. Indeed, direct or indirect 
answers can be found in the existing literature under different contexts. However, lack of 
recognition of them is evident in current public as well as academic discussions regarding 
asset prices and monetary policy. Thus, this paper attempts to provide some notes for   - 5 - 
clarifying them. More importantly, the clarification provides some insights that have not 
been articulated by the existing literature.  
We provide some qualifications from the beginning. First, we (explicitly or 
implicitly) consider asset prices from the “net wealth” perspective by using the capital 
price [Tobin’s (1969) q] as an aggregate proxy for asset prices. Second, we abstract the 
implication of (expected) inflation to asset prices. Indeed, we consider a situation where 
inflation expectations are well anchored by inflation-targeting monetary policy. Third, we 
abstract the implications of risk premia to asset prices by assuming future capital incomes 
are risk free. Fourth, unless noted otherwise, the interest rate means the long-term (risk-
free) interest rate. Note that the abstraction of inflation trivializes the difference between 
real and nominal interest rates (or other variables). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 clarifies the (fundamental paper) wealth effect of monetary policy. This 
issue has been studied decades before by the literature on the so-called interest-rate-
induced wealth effect (IRIWE); yet the insights provided by which are often overlooked 
by the current discussion on the wealth effect of monetary policy. Thus, we revisit the 
issue, in light of the IRIWE literature, but from the perspective of the current discussion. 
We show that a FPW change is in essence a process of wealth redistribution between 
current and future asset holders; and a FPW increase tends to make current consumers as 
a whole wealthier. Despite this, the wealth effect of monetary policy meant by the current 
literature tends to be partly attributable to the consumption (intertemporal) substitution 
effect.    - 6 - 
Section 3 formally studies the interplay between the wealth effect (on consumption) 
and Tobin’s q effect (on investment) of monetary policy. We find that, the stronger the 
Tobin’s q effect, the weaker the wealth effect. This result implies that, when it is costly in 
the margin to transform savings into new capital stock as the “concrete” wealth, paper 
wealth will be generated through asset price appreciation, which could result in savings 
being diverted back to consumption through the wealth effect.  
Section 4 inspects the determination of fundamental asset prices from a 
macroeconomic (stability) perspective. The perspective indicates that, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, fundamentals-driven asset price movements can likely cause asset 
price misalignments that need to be corrected by monetary responses. It also indicates 
that, contrary to conventional wisdom, higher future productivities might not necessarily 
lead to higher current fundamental asset prices. Conceptually, the inspection clarifies that 
the soundness of asset market performances, from the perspective of macroeconomic 
stability, depends on whether asset prices are compatible with the AD-AS balance in the 
long run, irrespective of their underlying driving forces being fundamental or not.  
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.   Fundamental Paper Wealth Effect 
Increases in asset values due to monetary expansion are FPW in the sense that they are 
increases in the present values of the same amount of underlying future incomes. The 
nature of FPW and its effect on consumption have been investigated in Hicks (1939), 
Keynes (1930, 1936), Leijonhufvud (1968), Pesek and Savings (1967), Sweeney (1988),   - 7 - 
among others,
2 which produce many insights as to the FPW effect. However, the insights 
are often overlooked by discussions on the wealth effect of monetary policy in the current 
literature.
3 
A detailed review of the IRIWE literature is beyond the scope of this paper.
4 In the 
following we focus on clarifying the current influential but casual interpretation of the 
wealth effect of monetary policy. We note that the essence of our clarifications has been 
said or implied in one way or another by the IRIWE (or other) literature. Our 
contribution, if any, is to distill the essence and bring it to the attention of the current 
wealth-effect literature.  
 
Clarification 
The current research on the wealth effect of monetary policy is conceptually based on the 
life cycle consumption function suggested by Modigliani (1971):  
0 0 W C ξ = ,   (1) 
which implies that the current consumption (C0) is positively—the consumption 
propensity 0 > ξ —related to the net worth (W0), i.e., the PV of lifetime incomes.   
Under a convenient assumption of unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which 
is often adopted to facilitate analyses of aggregate lifecycle consumption behaviors (e.g. 
Blanchard, 1985), a fall in the interest rate (due to monetary expansion) has no effect on 
                                                 
2 The FPW effect is more specifically called as the interest-rate-induced wealth effect (IRIWE) in this line 
of literature. Since the monetary effect on asset prices can also be viewed from the Tobin’s q perspective—
which will be adopted in the formal analysis in the next section—we prefer the term FPW, which captures 
the nature of asset price changes caused by monetary policy. Besides, as will be seen in the next section, in 
a general equilibrium framework, a change in the interest rate could induce not only changes in asset prices 
as the “paper wealth”, but also changes in the capital stock as the “concrete wealth”.  
3 The IRIWE literature is insightful but unsystematic—the authors approach the issue from different 
perspectives and use different conceptual frameworks and terminologies; and their discussions are mostly 
narrative and embedded in their books with much broader agendas.  
4  See Leijonhufvud (1968) and Sweeney (1988) for  the development of the IRIWE literature.   - 8 - 
ξ  but increases W0. Hence, according to equation (1), the increase in W0  will raise 
consumption proportionally despite its paper wealth nature. Indeed, such a FPW increase 
is often casually referred to as an increase in consumers’ wealth or lifetime resources; and 
the rise in the consumption is accordingly called as the “wealth effect” (e.g., Mishkin, 
1995; Modigliani, 1971, among many others). We clarify this casual interpretation in the 
following. For clarification, we call the proportional effect on consumption of FPW 
changes in W0 (under the unit elasticity assumption) as the “FPW effect”. 
To establish a conceptual foundation for the clarification, we first introduce two ways 
of decomposing the interest rate effect on consumption. One is a three-effect 
decomposition on which the casual interpretation is (explicitly or implicitly) based; and 
the other is a two-effect decomposition adopted by the IRIWE literature.   
Consider a Marshallian (current) consumption demand function  ) , ( 0 0 W r C , where r 
is the interest rate that essentially measures the price of current consumption in terms of 
that in the future. Denote the corresponding Hicksian demand function as  *) , ( 0 u r C
h , 
where u*(r, W0) is the indirect utility that measures the maximum achievable utility (or 
“wealthiness”) under r and W0.  
To see the effect of a change in the interest rate (dr) on C0, totally differentiate 
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The first term on the right-hand side (RHS) of equation (2) can be further decomposed 
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where *) , ( 0 u r e  is the expenditure (function) measured in terms of the current 
consumption. Note that  0 / 0 ≤ ∂ ∂ r e —a fall in r increases the costs of future (in terms of 
current) consumption and hence requires a higher expenditure budget (e0) to maintain the 
indirect utility level (u*)—the equality applies when future consumption is zero.  




























































0 0 0 , (4) 
where the first, second and third terms on the RHS are, respectively, the substitution, 
income and wealth effects—theirs signs on their tops.
5 
Intuitively, 1) the substitution effect measures the interest-rate effect on consumption 
given the original indirect utility level (u*)—a fall in the interest rate lowers the cost of 
current consumption in terms of that in the future and hence increases the current 
consumption; 2) the income effect measures the interest-rate effect on consumption 
through the lifetime consumption cost (measured by e0)—a fall in the interest rate makes 
lifetime consumption more expensive (in terms of current consumption) and hence 
decreases current (as well as future) consumption; and 3) the wealth effect measures the 
interest rate effect on consumption through the lifetime wealth (measured by W0)—a fall 
in the interest rate increases consumers’ wealth (in terms of current consumption) and 
hence increases the current (as well as future) consumption. 
                                                 
5 The origin of this three-effect decomposition, which has become a standard textbook material, is unclear 
to us. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, pp. 28-45) for discussion on the three-effect decomposition in a two-
period model. 
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A key point is that the wealth effect is not a proper measure of the interest rate effect 
on wealthiness. This is because a fall in the interest rate tends to increase not only the 
lifetime wealth (W0) but also the lifetime consumption cost (e0)—this is precisely the 
essence of the aforementioned “no richer” argument by Gramlich (2001).
6 Indeed, the 
proper measure is the sum of the wealth and income effects. To see this, we need the two-
effect decomposition, which is well known as the Hicksian decomposition.  
As opposed to the three-effect decomposition totally differentiating the Marshallian 

















= . (5) 
Equation (5) implies that the interest-rate effect can be decomposed into the substitution 
effect (the first RHS term) and the Hicksian wealth effect (the second term).
7 While the 
substitution effect here is identical to the same effect in the three-effect decomposition, 
the Hicksian wealth effect measures the interest-rate effect on consumption through the 
wealthiness level (u*).  
A comparison between the two versions of decomposition [equations (2) and (5)] 
indicates that the sum of the income and wealth effects is equal to the Hicksian wealth 
effect. Therefore, the income and wealth effects combined together (implicitly) measures 
the interest rate effect on the wealthiness.  
                                                 
6 Keynes (1936, p.94) made the same argument. Conceptually, the net worth W0 measures wealth in terms 
of current consumption; thus, for consumers who consume also in the future, interest-rate-induced net 
worth changes have ambiguous welfare implications. See Hicks (1939, p.232-235); Leijonhufvud (1968, 
chapter IV) for discussions. 
7 The Hicksian wealth effect here is originally called as the “income effect” by Hicks (1939) and sometimes 
also called as the “wealth effect” by later users of the Hicksian Apparatus (e.g., Leijonhufvud, 1968; King, 
1991; among others). Since the two terminologies (i.e., the wealth effect and income effect) used in the 
three-effect decomposition have different economic meanings than the same terms used in the Hicksian 
decomposition, to avoid terminology confusions, we follow the terminologies in the three-effect 
decomposition but use the term “Hicksian wealth effect” to denote the income (or wealth) effect in the 
Hicksian decomposition.   - 11 - 
With the conceptual foundation established, we proceed to clarify the FPW effect. In 
the consumption function (1), the substitution and income effects are captured by the 
interest-rate effect on ξ , while the wealth effect is captured by that on W0. Under the unit 
elasticity, the substitution and income effects exactly offset each other; thus the interest 
rate effect on ξ  is zero. Hence, the interest rate effect on consumption can be 
conveniently measured by the wealth effect. However, to interpret it as a wealth effect 
can be misleading. First, such an interpretation seems to suggest that a FPW increase 
raise consumption because it makes consumers wealthier. However, consumers with 
larger FPW could indeed become less wealthy when the underlying decline in the interest 
increases the lifetime consumption cost more than it increases the net worth; i.e., when 
the income effect dominates the wealth effect. Second, the exact cancellation between the 
substitution and income effects is not equivalent to the case of them being both zero—an 
offset positive substitution effect (implied by the unit elasticity) is still positive but not 
zero. If the income and wealth effects happen to cancel out—which is essentially what 
Hicks (1939, p. 232-235) argues for in an aggregate sense
8—what is often called as the 
wealth effect of monetary policy can also (perhaps should) be called as the substitution 
effect. In a word, with the unit elasticity assumption, the FPW effect is attributable (at 
least) partly to the substitution effect.  
If the substitution effect is zero,
9 a decline in the interest rate will increase W0 but 
decrease ξ through the income effect. The balance of the two effects (i.e., the Hicksian 
                                                 
8 A decline in the interest rate tends to benefit borrowers but cost lenders. Hicks argues that, since a lending 
must correspond to a borrowing, without distributional effects, the benefits of the borrowers and the costs 
of the lenders tend to cancel out in aggregate. Thus, the interest rate effect on the aggregate wealthiness 
tends to be zero; i.e., the income and wealth effects cancel out in aggregate. 
9 The literature on the magnitude of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is controversial. In general, 
empirical results indicate that the elasticity is less than unity; see Elmendorf (1996) for a survey.    - 12 - 
wealth effect) is ambiguous for individual consumers, depending on their income and 
consumption structures—the longer a consumer’s income horizon relative to her 
consumption horizon, the more likely she becomes wealthier from a decline in the 
interest rate (Hicks 1939, p. 232-235). However, according to Leijonhufvud (1968, p. 
258-259), a decline in the interest rate tends to make society (as a whole) wealthier 
because capital as the net wealth of society tends to have a longer income horizon than 
the consumption horizons of its owners. Based on the spirit of Leijonhufvud’s arguments, 
we show in the following that a FPW change is essentially a process of wealth 
redistribution between current and future capital owners; and a FPW increase tends to 
make current consumers as a whole wealthier. 
First, we explain that a FPW increase is a redistribution of wealth that benefits current 
capital owners at the cost of future owners. Suppose a monetary expansion lowers the 
interest rate from i to i' ( i i < ' ), then the price (q) of a piece of capital that earns a constant 
dividend (r) in every period will appreciate from  i r /  to  ' /i r , which provides the current 
owner of the capital a (paper) capital gain of the amount  ' / ) ' ( ii i i r − . It is a gain in the 
sense that, if currently being sold for consumption, the capital can provide  ' / ) ' ( ii i i r −  
amount of extra consumption. Where does this extra gain come from—note that the paper 
wealth increase does not create extra resources from the thin air? There are no free 
lunches—the gain is at the cost of future owners of the capital. At the original price, q 
dollar can own the whole piece of the capital that provides r amount of earning for each 
period. With the capital price appreciating to q', q dollar can only afford to  ' /q q  (or 
equivalently,  i i / ' ) unit of the ownership, which implies  i i i r / ) ' ( −  amount of earning loss 
in each period.  The PV of all the losses in all periods for the q dollar of investment is   - 13 - 
' / ) ' ( ii i i r − , which is precisely equal to the gain enjoyed by the current capital owner. In 
a sense, the gain enjoyed by the current owner is financed by the earning losses of the 
future owners. 
The fate of an individual consumer in the wealth redistribution due to a FPW change 
depends on the capital ownerships she currently has and plans to assume in the future. 
Current capital owners will be no richer from a paper gain if they choose to hold on the 
capital forever—in a sense, the paper gain is offset by the earning losses from assuming 
all of the future ownerships. There are many determinants of capital ownership 
assumptions or dispossessions: consumption horizon, bequest motives, or the whim for 
wealth as such, to name a few. We narrow our focus by assuming that economic woman 
and man derive utility from their own material consumption only. If so, a FPW increase 
tends to make current consumers as a whole wealthier. We explain this in the following. 
With finite-living consumers, capital will eventually be in the hands of consumers 
who are yet to be born. Since a (current) FPW increase benefits current capital owners at 
the costs of future owners, these unborn consumers, being among the future owners, are 
potential victims of the FPW increase. Since a FPW increase is a zero-summed wealth 
redistribution among all the consumers in all times, that the unborn  consumers are 
victims implies that the current (existing) consumers as a whole are winners. In a word, a 
FPW increase tends to make current consumers as whole wealthier, albeit not in the 
Pareto sense—some current consumers might incur net losses from assuming future 
capital ownerships;
10 but in the compensational sense—the net gain for the current 
consumers as a whole is positive thanks to the (potential) loss of the unborn consumers.  
                                                 
10 Viewed from another angle, they lose from lower returns to savings.   - 14 - 
Setting aside the distributional effects among the current consumers,
11 the wealthier 
current consumers as a whole will tend to consume more in aggregate. In a word, a FPW 
increase tends to increase the aggregate consumption by making current consumers as a 
whole wealthier. Therefore, besides the substitution effect, a positive (aggregate) FPW 
effect also captures consumption increase due to increase in wealthiness. In this sense, 
the casual “wealth effect” interpretation is not a complete misnomer.  
 
Summary 
Although asset price appreciation due to monetary expansion is a FPW increase due to 
revaluation of the same amount of underlying incomes, it tends to make current 
consumers as a whole wealthier. The wealthier current consumers tend to consume more 
in aggregate. However, without the substitution effect, the increase in the aggregate 
consumption will be less than proportional to the FPW increase. In sum, the FPW effect 
is attributable partly to the substitution effect and partly to the increase in the aggregate 
wealthiness of current consumers.  
 
Implication 
One rationale for low inflation being a monetary goal is to protect people from losing 
their hard-earned wealth. Yet possible monetary effect on asset prices might imply a 
different way of losing wealth. Consider a situation of excessive aggregate demand. If 
                                                 
11 By no means unimportant, the distributional effects among the current consumers are an empirical issue. 
There are two rough observations. On the one hand, the significance of the FPW effect could be enhanced 
by the fact that (non-human) wealth tends to be owned by consumers who have relative shorter 
consumption horizons and hence stronger consumption propensity; on the other, the significance could be 
reduced by the fact that most of long-term assets are held by minority wealthy consumers who tend to have 
smaller consumption propensities.    - 15 - 
monetary authorities are inactive, the resulting inflation will lead to wealth loss through 
the so-called “real balance effect” (Pigou, 1943). However, if monetary authorities 
choose to avoid inflation by tightening money, wealth could also be lost from decreases 
in asset prices. As opposed to a FPW increase by which each of many victimized future 
capital owners tends to “contribute” only a little earning loss to finance the capital gain 
enjoyed by current capital owners, a FPW decrease is a reverse redistribution that could 
cost the current owners dearly.  
Although society as a whole cannot avoid FPW variations, individuals can by holding 
liquid assets. Thus, the significance of a FPW decrease depends on who holds long-term 
assets. It might not matter much if the long-term assets are held by consumers who can 
afford large variations in wealth; yet, it is a matter of concern if the long-term assets are 
also non-trivially in the wealth portfolios of consumers who cannot afford substantial 
capital losses, e.g., those in their retirements. As stock ownership becomes increasingly 
popular due to the 1990s stock market booms; and reforms in the U.S. social security 
system could further increase the popularity, the effect of monetary policy on asset prices 
could be or become a non-trivial issue. More implications of the FPW effect will be 
discussed in the next two sections. 
In this section, monetary policy is assumed to affect asset prices only through the 
interest rate; and the potential monetary effect on the yields of assets through investments 
is abstracted. In the next section we relax the assumption and formally study the wealth 
effect
12 of monetary policy with focus on its interplay with the Tobin’s q effect.  
 
                                                 
12 In the sense that current consumers do become wealthier from a FPW increase, the term “wealth effect” 
(of monetary policy) is not qualitatively misleading. For simplicity, we will use it in the remainder of the 
paper. We will use the term FPW when emphases are needed.    - 16 - 
3.   Interplay between the Wealth and Tobin’s q Effects  
The wealth effect of monetary policy depends on monetary effect on asset prices. Based 
on the PV rule, it is commonly held that monetary expansion tends to raise asset prices by 
decreasing the interest rate. From the perspective of Tobin’s q, this is equivalent to saying 
that monetary expansion raises q through a higher demand on capital. However, the 
decreased interest rate could also increase investments and hence lead to decreases in the 
yields of assets, which tend to dampen the rise in asset prices. Or from the q perspective, 
the response of the capital supply through the Tobin’s q effect could dampen the rise in q. 
Therefore, a general equilibrium perspective that considers both the capital demand and 
supply is apt for a more rigorous analysis of monetary effect on asset prices and the 
wealth effect.
13 We conduct the analysis in the following.  
To model the wealth effect, an overlapping generations (OLG) framework will be 
used to capture the feature of finite consumption horizon. For simplicity, we use a two-
period OLG model; yet the results can be generalized in a multi-period one such as 
Blanchard’s (1985) model. Since the two-period horizon framework is a theoretical 
abstraction, we will provide qualifications to the results.   
 
The Model 
In a two-period OLG model, the private sector is composed of the (young and old) 
consumers, firms and entrepreneurs.  
                                                 
13 We are aware of no existing study on the interplay between the wealth effect and the Tobin’s q effect. 
The two effects are often listed as two monetary policy transmission mechanisms without the interplay 
being discussed (see Kuttner and Mosser (2002); Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002); and  Mishkin (1995) 
for surveys of the literature on monetary transmission mechanisms).  In general equilibrium models where 
q plays a major role, the wealth effect is either dismissed [e.g. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)] or 
trivialized by the adoption of infinite-horizon modeling frameworks.    - 17 - 
The young consumers are the owners of human wealth who work and finance 
consumption by labor incomes, while the old consumers are the owners of non-human 
wealth who retire and finance consumption by asset holdings. Certainly consumers in the 
real world can own both human and non-human wealth; thus the young and old 
consumers in this model should be viewed as theoretical abstraction of consumers’ 
characteristics based on their human and non-human wealth respectively.  
The firms abstractly represent the function of production that is a process of using 
capital and labor to produce consumption output, while the entrepreneurs abstractly 
represent the function of investment that is a process of transforming consumption goods 
into new capital.  
The public sector is composed of the fiscal and monetary authorities. The fiscal 
authority uses revenues from tax and/or government bond issuance to finance expenses. 
The monetary authority controls the money supply in the private sector through open 
market operations (OMO).  
There are three kinds of assets: money, (government) bond and capital. Bond and 
capital are perfect substitutes. Besides being a store of value, money also provides 
liquidity services.  
All of the four markets—(consumption) goods, money, bond and capital—are 
efficient.  
In the following we first model the behaviors of the private and public sectors and 
then discuss the equilibrium in each market.
14 Our goal is to see the effect of monetary 
policy on AD (especially aggregate consumption demand) through the wealth effect 
interacting with the Tobin’s q effect. 
                                                 
14The Walras’ Law allows us to discuss only the equilibria in the goods, money and capital market.    - 18 - 
 
Consumption 
A consumer has a two-period life cycle: at the beginning of period t, the t-period young 
consumer is born; she supplies inelastically one unit of labor during period t and receives 
real wage income ( t w ) at the end of the period; after paying real tax ( t T ), she consumes 
t C1  and saves in capital ( t K1 ), nominal government bond ( t D1 ), and/or money ( t M1 ); she 
carries over her assets into and retires during the next period t+1; and at the end of which 
she finishes her life cycle by cashing in and consuming ( 1 2 + t C ) the gross return to her 
savings. Assume no population growth and normalize the number of newborns as one.  
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where  t P  is the consumption price at the end of period t;  t i  is the rate of interest for 
government bond during period t;  t q  is the real capital price at the end of period t; and  t r  
is the rate of capital income during period t. The consumer has intertemporally separable 
utility over consumption with time preference θ ; and the real money balance provides 
liquidity services with β  measuring the consumer’s liquidity preference. We assume log 
utility for analytical convenience.    - 19 - 
First order conditions give the young consumer’s current consumption demand  
) ( 1 t t t T w C − =ξ  (6) 
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Production 
In every period, identical and perfectly competitive firms hire capital and labor to 
produce consumption goods with the standard Cobb-Douglas technology. With the 
inelastic unit labor supply, the aggregate production function is  
α
t t t t K A K F Y = = ) ( , (9) 
where Kt, Yt, and At are, respectively, the capital stock, output and productivity parameter. 
Perfect competition and zero profit conditions make firms pay factors by their marginal 
products: 
) ( ' t t K F r = ,   (10) 
) ( ' ) ( t t t K KF K F w − = . (11)   - 20 - 
Investment 
In every period, identical entrepreneurs engage in investments that transform 
consumption goods into new capital. At the end of period t, an entrepreneur j chooses the 
amount of investment (
j
t I ) to maximize expected utility:  
) (
j
t U E Max Π  






t I c I q − = Π  is the entrepreneur j’s profit from investment— ) (I c  is the 
investment cost (function) in terms of consumption. If any, entrepreneurs will hold 
investment profits earned at the end of period t in form of capital and sell them at the end 




t t I I .  
Without loss of generality, assume zero depreciation in capital. Thus, 
t t t I K K + = +1 . (12) 
 
Fiscal policy 
To abstract fiscal implications, assume balanced fiscal policies in every period. Thus, the 
outstanding government bond (D) is constant at D . D is a one-period bond.
15 At the end 
of every period, the fiscal authority pays off interest payments due and rolls over the 
principal at the interest rate determined by the current asset markets. The outstanding 
government bond D  is either held by the private sector (Dt) or by the monetary authority 
(
g
t D ): 
                                                 
15 If D is a long-term bond with fixed coupon rates, monetary policy will have a wealth effect through 
affecting the bond price. We abstract this feature since it is in essence not much different than the wealth 
effect mechanism through the capital price q.    - 21 - 
D D D
g
t t = + . (13) 
Fiscal incomes include real tax on the young consumer
16 (Tt) and the interest income 
(
g
t tD i ) turned in by the monetary authority. Fiscal outlays include interest payments for 
the outstanding bond ( D it ) and government consumption that is assumed to be zero 
without loss of generality. Thus, the balanced-budget policy implies  D i D i T P t
g
t t t t = + . 
 
Monetary policy 
The monetary authority decides the period t+1 money supply (Mt+1) in the private sector 






t M M D D − = − + + 1 1 , (14) 
which implies that the change in the money supply (RHS) is balanced by the change in 
the monetary authority’s bond holding (LHS). According to equations (13) and (14),  
t t t t D M D M + = + + + 1 1 ,    (15) 
which implies that the total value of M and D held by the private sector is not affected by 
OMO. Therefore, the monetary policy so modeled will affect the net wealth of the private 
sector only through influencing the capital price q.  
 
Identities: 
                                                 
16 The assumption of tax on the young consumer only is to avoid the complication of monetary policy 
affecting the PV of a consumer’s lifetime tax liability, which is another kind of “wealth effect” yet 
irrelevant to the main issue here.    - 22 - 
The asset stocks (capital, bond or money) held by the private sector in period t equals the 
corresponding assets acquired by the young consumer at the end of period t-1. Thus, 
1 1 − = t t K K ;  1 1 − = t t D D ; and  1 1 − = t t M M . 
 
The Goods Market 
The AD (for consumption goods) at the end of period t is composed of the young 
consumption [equation (6)], the old consumption [equation (8)] and the cost of the 
entrepreneur’s investment [ ) ( t I c ] that will be specified later.  
We assume that price is sticky in the short run (normalized to one): 1 1 = = + t t t P P E . 
We also do not model adjustments in output, which is determined by the existing capital 
and labor [equation (9)].  
The simplification in modeling the supply side (output and price) of the economy is 
for the purpose of clearly inspecting the core issue, i.e., the monetary effect on the AD 
through the interplay between the wealth effect and the Tobin’s q effect. A general view 
regarding monetary transmission is that monetary policy influences the AD, which in turn 
affects output and/or price, depending on the output potential and price adjustment 
mechanisms. The final effects of monetary policy depend not only on its effect on the AD 
but also on the subsequent real and nominal effects of the AD shock.  To show the 
monetary effect on the AD only, we abstract the complication that the affected AD could 
in turn influence output and/or price, which will feed back to the AD till the AD-AS 
balance is reached.
17 
                                                 
17 See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) for an example of studying monetary transmission 
mechanisms (the credit channel in the paper) in a business cycle context that includes further supply-side   - 23 - 
According to equation (6),  
0 / 1 1 = + t t dM dC , (16)   
which implies that money has no effect on the young’s consumption demand. This is 
because monetary policy affects neither the young’s wealth, which is her current 
disposable income, nor her consumption propensity (x) due to the log utility.
18  
According to equation (8),  
t t t t t K dM dq dM dC ) / ( / 1 1 2 + + = , (17) 
which implies the (non-human) wealth effect of monetary policy. Equation (17) together 
with (16) implies the following proposition regarding the wealth effect: 
 
Proposition 1  The effect of monetary policy on aggregate consumption demand is 
positively related to its effect on the capital price.
19  
 
The money market 
Under the price rigidity assumption, the (young consumer’s) demand for money 




















+ βξ , (7') 
                                                                                                                                                 
transmissions. Studying the wealth effect channel and its interaction with other channels in a business cycle 
context is an interesting topic for future research.   
18 On the one hand, the log utility assumption implies existence of the substitution effect, without which 
money will negatively affect x. On the other, the two-period simplification abstracts future labor incomes as 
human wealth, with which money will have a positive “non-human wealth effect”. Intuitively, a monetary 
expansion tends to increase human wealth owners’ consumption through the substitution effect but 
decrease it through the Hicksian (human) wealth effect—the income horizons of human wealth tend to be 
shorter than the consumption horizons of its owners. Since the balance of the two effects cannot be 
determined a priori, equation (16), which implies that the two effects are exactly counterbalanced, is a 
neutral standing—after all, the core issue here is the non-human wealth effect. 
19 According to the discussion in the last section, this proposition will hold even when the assumptions of 
two-period horizon and log utility are relaxed.   - 24 - 











i.e., monetary expansion tends to reduce the short-term interest rate.  
 
 
The Capital Market 
The demand for capital comes from the young consumer’s saving. Perfect substitution 
between capital and bond implies a no-arbitrage condition: 
)] ( [ ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 + + + + + = + t t t t t t t q r P E i q P , (18) 
where the LHS and RHS represent the returns to t tq P  (dollar) investment in bond and 














































where ) 1 / ( 1 − = − v v v P P π  is the inflation rate in period v—note that πt+1 is equal to zero 
due to the price rigidity assumption. Equation (19), being a version of the PV rule, is 
essentially a capital demand function that relates the capital price (qt) to the capital stock 
(Kt+1) that is implied by the capital income (rt+1). To determine the general equilibrium 
capital price, we need the capital supply function as well. 
The supply of capital comes from two sources: one is the supply of existing capital by 
the old consumer’s asset decumulation; and the other is the supply of new capital through 
entrepreneurs’ investments. While the finite horizon makes the old consumer’s capital   - 25 - 
supply perfectly inelastic, q will tend to influence entrepreneurs’ investments.  We model 
investment behaviors in the following.  
First, in a simple case, assume a constant marginal cost of investment (normalized to 
one):  t t I I c = ) ( . Assume no uncertainty, thus the entrepreneurs’ utility maximization 




t I q ) 1 ( − = Π . This implies 
that a competitive equilibrium in the capital market will only be reached when the capital 
price is  
1 = t q . (20) 
As a capital supply function, equation (20) implies perfect elastic investment (to q). 
Perfect elastic investment is rare in reality; and many “impediments” could make 
investment less than perfect elastic (LTPE). Here we discuss two fundamental cases:
20 
one is convex investment adjustment costs and the other is risky investments coupled 
with risk-averse entrepreneurs. We start with the case of convex adjustment costs. 
Suppose the aggregate investment cost function is in the form of   
) 1 ( ) ( t t t I I I c γ + = , (21) 
where  0 > γ  implies convex adjustment costs.
21 Without uncertainty, the utility-
maximizing representative entrepreneur chooses  t I  to maximize profit:  
) ( t t t t I c I q Max − = Π  
subject to the investment cost function (21); the result of which is 
t t t I I c q γ 2 1 ) ( ' + = = . (22) 
                                                 
20 By fundamental we mean impediments not caused by irrational behaviors or institutional imperfections.  
21 Following the literature of investment adjustment costs, we use a representative agent (entrepreneur) 
framework rather than the n-entrepreneur framework specified above. See Abel and Eberly (1997) for the 
investment cost functional form, i.e., equation (21).   - 26 - 
With 0 > γ , equation (22) implies LTPE investment and hence an upward-sloping capital 
supply function.   
LTPE investment can also be due to entrepreneurs’ risk aversion. Without loss of 
generality, suppose the risk is on the cost of capital:  






t z I I c + = , (23) 
where  ) , 0 ( ~
2 σ N z
j
t  is a normally distributed random variable. Suppose entrepreneurs 
are risk averse with utility function:  
Π − − = Π
ϕ e U ) ( , (24) 
which implies constant absolute risk aversion. According to the investment cost function 
(23) and the utility function (24), entrepreneur j chooses investment (
j
t I ) to maximize 
expected utility  
∫
− − − Π − − = Π Π − = Π
] 2 / ) 1 [(
2 2
) ( ) (











t t e d f e U E , 
the solution to which gives j’s investment function: 
j
t t I q
2 1 ϕσ + = . With n identical 







+ = . (25) 
The capital supply function (25) implies that, under risky investments (σ > 0) and risk-
averse entrepreneurs (ϕ > 0), the aggregate investment is LTPE. The riskier the 
investments are; or the more risk-averse the entrepreneurs are, the less elastic the 
aggregate investment is.  
Suppose the number of entrepreneurs is large enough ( 0 >> n ), then, according to the 










t t I z n I I c I c = + = = ∑ ∑
=1
) ( ) ( ) ( , (26) 
which implies a constant marginal cost for the aggregate investment. Despite the 
marginal investment cost being constant in aggregate, the increasing risk premia required 
by risk-averse entrepreneurs make the aggregate investment LTPE.  
 The capital supply functions (20), (22) and (25) can be generalized into  
t t I q η + =1  (27) 
With capital demand and supply being specified, we proceed to discuss the effect of 
monetary policy on the equilibrium capital price (
e
t q ), which is determined by a 
simultaneous system composed of the capital demand function (19), the capital supply 
function (27), the money demand function (7'), and equation (10) together with (12) that 
determines the relationship between capital income (rt+1) and investment (It). We will use 
comparative statics based on the simultaneous system to show how a monetary shock 
( 1 + t dM ) affects 
e
t q .  
First, we need to specify how  1 + t dM  affects the expectation terms ( v ti E ,  v t E π  and 
s tr E ) in the capital demand function (19), which is also a version of PV rule for capital 
valuation. For analytical convenience, we assume that capital is valued by a practically 















t , (19') 
where i , π  and r  are, respectively, the expected long-term interest rate, expected future 
inflation rate, and expected future (average) capital income.    - 28 - 
In general, monetary policy can be viewed as monetary authorities using targeted 
short-term interest rates and/or other means (e.g. verbal signals) to influence the long-
term interest rate, which is what really matters for asset prices and investments but 
depends on market expectations. For simplicity, assume  1 + = t di i d τ , where τ (> 0) 
measures the indirect effect of  1 + t dM  on the long-term interest rate through the short-
term rate.  
Expectations on future inflations depend mainly on monetary authorities’ inflation 
targets and the creditability of the targets. For simplicity, assume that  1 + t dM  affects 
neither the targets nor their creditability; i.e.,  0 / 1 = + t dM dπ .  
For simplicity, suppose the average growth rate of the capital income is g, i.e., 
1 + = t gr r . Assume  1 + t dM  is not expected to affect g; then,  1 1 / / + + = t t r dr r r d .
22 
With the expectations being pinned down, comparative statics analysis can be 
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t t dM dI
, 
which imply the following propositions: 
                                                 
22 The standard rational expectation paradigm is not applicable here since we focus on the monetary effect 
on AD and do not model the further interactions between AD and AS. Yet the assumptions here on the 
expectations capture the standard features of asset price evaluation in reality. Since the main point here (as 
will be shown later) is that the elasticity of capital supply matters for the monetary effect on the equilibrium 
capital price, the above assumptions, which matter mainly for the monetary effect on capital demand, are to 
us acceptable compromises for analytical convenience.   - 29 - 
 
Proposition 2 Under perfect elastic investment, monetary policy has no influence over 
the equilibrium q [result (a)]; thus the wealth effect of monetary policy is zero 
(proposition 1). 
 
Proposition 3 Under LTPE investment, monetary policy positively affects the equilibrium 
q [result (a)]. The more elastic the investment is, the stronger the Tobin’s q effect [result 
(b)] on investment; yet the weaker the monetary effect on the equilibrium q [result (c)]; 
and hence the weaker the wealth effect (proposition 1).  
 
The intuition behind these two propositions is straightforward. A monetary expansion 
leads to excessive demand for capital, which could be satisfied by an increase in either 
the quantity or price of capital, most likely both. The more elastic the investment is, the 
larger part of the excessive demand will be satisfied by the increase in capital stock; and 
hence the smaller its effect on the increase in capital price, which implies a smaller 
wealth effect. In a word, (the magnitude of) the wealth effect negatively depends on the 
Tobin’s q effect.  
 
Implication 
Whether monetary authorities’ AD targets are achieved through the Tobin’s q effect or 
the wealth effect might not be important from the point of view of short-term stability; 
yet it is non-trivial from the point of view of long-term growth because, while the 
investment part of AD helps to accumulate national wealth, the consumption part helps to   - 30 - 
decumulate it. In the following, we show that the wealth effect can divert savings back to 
consumption.  
In the above model, suppose that the monetary authority credibly targets zero-
inflation; thus the role of monetary policy is to keep the money supply (or essentially the 
interest rate) at a level consistent with the AD-AS balance, i.e., the goods market 
equilibrium:  
) ( ) ( 2 1 t t t t I c C C K F + + =  (28) 
The gross saving (GS) comes from the young consumer’s saving:  t t t t C T w GS 1 − − ≡ , 
while the net saving (NS) depends also on the old consumer’s dissaving. In aggregate, 
what is not consumed must be saved; thus,  t t t t C C K F NS 2 1 ) ( − − = .  
Consider a decrease in the young consumer’s consumption propensity ( ξ d <0), 
which, according to equation (6), tends to generate extra GS by the amount of 
ξ d T w t t ) ( − − . However, according to a simultaneous system composed of equations (6), 
(8), (27) and (28), the increase in the NS would be  ξ η d K T w t t )] 1 /( ) [( + − − , which could 
fall short of the extra GS if the investment is LTPE (i.e.,  0 > η ). It is not difficult to see 
that the larger η is; i.e., the less elastic the investment is, the smaller portion of the extra 
GS can be realized into the NS, which implies that the larger portion of it will be diverted 
back to consumption. Intuitively, the extra GS leads to insufficient AD that entails 
monetary expansion, the effect of which depends on the interplay between the Tobin’s q 
effect and the wealth effect. Implied by proposition 3, the less elastic the investment is, 
the larger portion of the AD shortfall will be covered by consumption through the wealth   - 31 - 
effect, while the smaller portion will be covered by investment through the q effect. In a 
sense, part of the extra GS is crowded out through the wealth effect.  
  During the end of 1990s, the already low U.S. personal saving rate plummeted 
further despite the baby boomers being at their prime saving ages. Policymakers 
attributed the fall to the wealth effect of the stock market booms (Greenspan 2000a, b). 
What factors caused the booms and how much the wealth effect contributed to the low 
saving are empirical issues in the end. Yet, the saving crowd-out mechanism discussed 
above implies conceptually that, if it is costly in the margin to transform the baby 
boomers’ large savings (not mentioning abundant foreign savings provided by the 
favorable world capital market) into new capital as “concrete” wealth, paper wealth will 
be generated through asset price appreciation and cause consumption booms. The 
resulting low saving will then be not a result of spendthrifts but that of prosperity from 
the paper wealth. Yet, such paper wealth prosperity not only hinders the accumulation of 
capital on which future incomes depend, but also could be easily turned into poverty by 
possible paper wealth destruction in the future when retired baby boomers start 
decumulating their wealth, or when the U.S. assets lose their appeal for some reason.  
Although such a paper wealth boom-bust cycle is ultimately driven by economic 
fundamentals (i.e., the baby boom demographic feature or shocks in the world capital 
market), monetary policy plays a role of accomplice even though it is for the purpose of 
maintaining the AD-AS balance. In a word, monetary policy for maintaining price 
stability in goods market could generate price instability in asset markets.
23 This is 
                                                 
23 At least, monetary authorities’ commitments to price stability in goods market deprive them of the ability 
in stabilizing asset markets.    - 32 - 
because, by essentially using the interest rate to influence AD, monetary policy tends to 
have “side effects” on asset prices (see the proposition 2 and 3).
24  
AD policies that use other instruments could (in principle) avoid the side effects. For 
example, investment subsidies can be used to facilitate investments to cover insufficient 
AD without destabilizing the interest rate or asset prices. Yet, elements such as “dosage”, 
timing, and flexibility (not mentioning various political economy factors) tend to make 
monetary policy the only suitable AD policy, at least for the purpose of short-term 
stability. Therefore, asset price fluctuations caused or acquiesced by monetary policy 
might be something that has to be put up with; so might be the paper wealth nature of 
capital.  
However, while monetary expansion is always welcomed by financial communities, 
tightening tends to draw criticisms, especially when its purpose is perceived as to curb 
booming asset markets. In the next section, we address the issue of whether monetary 
authorities should respond to asset market variations.  
 
4.  Fundamental asset prices: a macroeconomic perspective 
A common view holds that asset price movements driven by fundamental factors should 
not be a concern of (let alone intervened by) monetary authorities. Accordingly, another 
common view holds that, since monetary authorities are no better than markets in 
detecting “bubbles”, it would be better for them to leave asset markets alone.
25  
                                                 
24 To increase the elasticity of investment through reducing investment adjustment costs or nurturing 
entrepreneur spirits will certainly help mitigating the side effects; yet perfect elastic investment is hardly an 
achievable goal.  
25 This view is popular in financial communities and also receives sympathy from academia. For example, 
in discussing whether monetary authorities should respond to asset price movements, Bernanke and Gertler 
(1999, p. 18,) argue that “policy should not respond to changes in asset prices, except insofar as they signal 
changes in expected inflation. Trying to stabilize asset prices per se is problematic for a variety of reasons,   - 33 - 
Facing such conventional wisdom, despite admittedly taking asset markets into 
consideration for monetary policy designs, monetary authorities usually deny aiming 
directly at them.  However, such denials are not always convincing, especially when 
policy action is preemptive tightening for releasing inflation pressure whose existence is 
subject to judgment.  
The Fed’s late 1990s tightening was such a case. For fear of a U.S. copy of Japan’s 
experience in the 1980s—rapid booming asset markets sustained by easy money in a low 
inflation environment eventually collapsed, resulting in a depressed economy still 
struggling nowadays, the Fed initiated a tightening from mid-1999 till mid-2000 with six 
consecutive (Fed Funds) rate hikes. Without obvious signs of inflation, the tightening was 
officially justified as preemption over inflation pressure (Greenspan, 1999). Yet, many 
observers in financial communities interpreted it as Fed’s act to curb then booming stock 
markets—an understandable suspicion after all the talks by the Fed officials about 
“irrational exuberance” and “wealth effect”. They complained that such an intervention 
was unfounded for the stock prices then were consistent with the promising future 
productivity potential in the New Economy, if not undervalued. Facing many such 
complaints, Fed stressed frequently that the tightening was not aimed at the stock markets 
per se but to prevent the wealth effect from destabilizing inflation. Yet, such a 
circumventing explanation is hardly convincing: if the stock prices are fundamental, why 
worry about the wealth effect? In another word, do not the Fed’s concerns over the 
wealth effect imply unsound stock market performances? Apparently, a clarification is 
needed. We attempt to provide one here. 
                                                                                                                                                 
not the least of which is that it is nearly impossible to know for sure whether a given change in asset values 
results from fundamental factors, nonfundamental factors, or both.” (Emphasis original).   - 34 - 
The main point of our clarification is straightforward: fundamentals-driven asset price 
movements are also likely to be misalignments that reflect changes in the underlying 
interest rate; thus monetary responses to such movements are not interventions but 
realignments for accommodating the interest rate changes. Details of the clarification are 
as follows. 
First we clarify the concept of fundamental asset prices. Fundamental asset prices are 
commonly defined as prices reflecting assets’ underlying (risk-adjusted) yields—higher 
asset prices due to higher yields are fundamental, while those due to irrational exuberance 
are bubbles. However, asset prices also depend on how the yields are discounted. Then, is 
there a “fundamental” discount factor? Financial analysts or other practical PV rule users 
who oftentimes simply take the current interest rate as given might be uninterested in 
such a question. Yet, monetary authorities and macroeconomists who take stable inflation 
as a fundamental state of economy tend to consider the so-called equilibrium (real) 
interest rate (EIR) as the fundamental discount factor. To distinguish between 
fundamental asset prices under the EIR and those under any other, we call the former as 
the “equilibrium fundamental asset prices” (EFAP).
26  
With a clearer concept of fundamental asset prices, that fundamentals-driven asset 
price movements can also be misalignments is straightforward: Since changes in 
fundamentals tend to affect not only assets’ underlying yields but also the EIR, asset 
price movements that reflect the yield changes only will nevertheless be misalignments to 
the EFAP. Yet, the adjustment process of the EIR to its new equilibrium needs monetary 
facilitation. Thus, monetary responses to fundamentals-driven asset prices could be 
                                                 
26 The term might seem redundant to some readers who take EFAP as the fundament asset prices. Yet, its 
merit will be clear in the discussion followed.    - 35 - 
seemingly “interventions” but indeed monetary accommodations of changes in the EIR.  
For example, asset price appreciation driven by higher future productivities is commonly 
taken as fundamental; yet it could cause misalignments (to the EFAP) by generating 
excessive AD (through the wealth and Tobin’s q effects) under the original interest rate. 
The excessive AD indicates that the productivity growth has led to a higher EIR. Then 
monetary tightening for dampening the excessive AD appears as an intervention but is 
indeed realignment needed for accommodating the underlying interest rate hike.  
In light of the above clarification, the Fed’s explanation of rationale for the late 1990s 
tightening would have been more convincing were it understood as follows. The claim of 
“not aiming at stock markets per se” implies that the Fed do not judge whether there are 
non-fundamental elements behind the booms or not; and the explanation of “aiming at the 
wealth effect of the booms” implies that the Fed believe that the booms, fundamental or 
not, might have led to an increase in the underlying interest rate.  
In a word, the controversy around the late 1990s tightening is due to the common but 
misleading view that fundamentals-driven asset price movements need no responses of 
monetary policy, without which the Fed’s circumventing and awkward explanation might 
not have been necessary in the first place.  
Clarifying this view has two implications. First, it frees monetary authorities from 
unnecessary burden of policy justification. For example, rapid asset market booms such 
as the one experienced by the U.S. in the 1990s tend to cause (financial and real) 
economic imbalances, irrespective of the booms being driven by rational or irrational 
exuberance.
27 Since the real economic imbalances might not be overt in the short run due 
                                                 
27 See Borio, English and Filardo (2003) for discussion of financial imbalance buildup in an inflation-
benign environment.   - 36 - 
to various short-term nominal rigidities, preemptive monetary actions are needed to 
prevent them from developing to the extent where corrections could severely disrupt the 
economy. Yet, if the “burden of proof” of bubbles hinders the preemptive actions—lack 
of proof might make monetary authorities hesitate to preempt or make preemption hard to 
be pushed through—“bubble” booms-busts might eventually result even if the initial 
booms are rational (as far as market expectation on future productivities is concerned) 
and speculation free.  
Second, the clarification also helps to disabuse financial communities of the notion 
that monetary responses to asset market performances must imply that monetary 
authorities disagree with markets over future economic prospects; and particularly, the 
notion that preemptive tightening implies monetary authorities’ detection of bubbles. 
Without such notions, disturbances to market psychology due to misreading monetary 
actions, which could cause unnecessary asset market or broader fluctuations and 
complicate the job of monetary authorities, can be avoided.  
The notion that fundamentals-driven asset price movements could cause 
misalignments to the EFAP naturally begs for an inspection of the EFAP determination. 
Since many factors influence the EIR, the commonly used PV rule is not an adequate 
conceptual foundation for the inspection. Instead, a macroeconomic perspective whereby 
the determinations of the EFAP and EIR are considered together will provide a better 
view. In the following, we use the model presented in the last section to get the better 
view. Despite the simplicity of the model, the view provides some non-trivial but under-
appreciated insights.    - 37 - 
In the model, the general equilibrium capital price (
E
t q ),
28 defined as the one 
consistent with simultaneous equilibria in all the markets, can be determined by a 
simultaneous system composed of equations (6), (8), (11), (26), (27) and (28). In a 
reduced form, 
) , , ; , , (
+ − +
= η ξ t t t t
E
t A D M K q q , (29) 
where the signs on top of the parameters are the signs of their partial effects on 
E
t q .  
Assume away any non-fundamental element; then 
E
t q  is an aggregate proxy of the 
EFAP. A little inspection of equation (29) provides two insights about the EFAP 
determination. 
First, the EFAP are affected by current economic conditions and behaviors. 
According to equation (29), 1) the current productivity (At) positively influences 
E
t q —
higher asset prices are needed to stimulate AD to balance higher current output potential 
resulting from higher current productivity; 2) the current consumption propensity (x) 
negatively influences 
E
t q —an increase in consumption propensity tends to result in an 
excessive AD needed to be offset by a decline in asset prices; and 3) the elasticity of 
investment (measured reversely by h) negatively influences 
E
t q  for reasons that have 
been discussed in detail in the last section.   
Second, contrary to conventional wisdom, future  productivities could have little 
influence over the EFAP. Indeed, equation (29) indicates no influence of future 
productivities over 
E
t q —the PV rule [equation (19)] is not even in the simultaneous 
                                                 
28 Note the difference between q
E and  q
e in the last section: the former is the general-equilibrium q 
consistent with simultaneous equilibria in all the markets, while the latter merely needs to be consistent 
with equilibrium in the capital market.    - 38 - 
system that determines 
E
t q . Intuitively, even though a rise in future productivities, by 
increasing  future capital incomes, puts upward pressure on q,  q  will not rise in 
equilibrium because that would cause an excessive AD over AS—note that the AS in the 
model here is constrained by the current output. The excessive AD will drive the interest 
rate up till the upward pressure on q is completely released. Certainly, the “irrelevancy” 
of future productivities to the EFAP is not a general result.
29 Yet the point is that the 
effect of future productivities on the EFAP tends to be constrained by current economic 
conditions—so strong is the constraint in the model here that future productivities 
become irrelevant.  
In summary, from the better-viewed macroeconomic perspective, the link between 
assets’ (equilibrium) fundamental prices and their underlying future yields are not as tight 
as it seems to be from the point of view of the PV rule; rather, the EFAP tend to be 
“anchored” by the current macroeconomic condition. This insight sheds some light on 
current debates over whether inflation-targeting monetary policy should react directly to 
asset price movements.   
Many opponents to the direct monetary reaction (“the Opponents” in short) argue that 
monetary policy should not react directly to asset price movements (except for those 
signaling changes in expected inflation) because monetary authorities are not good at 
                                                 
29 The irrelevancy is due to the constrained AS (by the current output) in the simple model here. In an open 
economy where AS is not constrained completely by domestic output thanks to supplies in the world goods 
market, higher future productivities could increase the fundamental q. However, since neither foreign 
supplies of goods nor foreign demands for domestic assets are perfectly elastic; besides, not all the goods 
are tradable, AS will be constrained to some extent. Therefore, the effect of productivity growth on the 
interest rate will thwart the asset price level from reaching the “fundamental” level based on a naïve 
assumption that the underlying interest rate will remain steady even when future productivities increase 
dramatically.    - 39 - 
detecting asset price misalignments, at least not better than markets themselves 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, 2001; among many others). Instead, they suggest that  
 
“[b]y focusing on the inflationary or deflationary pressures generated by asset price 
movements, a central bank effectively responds to the toxic side effects of asset booms 
and busts without getting into the business of deciding what is fundamental and what is 
not.” (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999: p. 18; emphasis added).  
 
Yet, some proponents to the direct reaction (“the Proponents”) argue that identifying 
asset price misalignments, albeit difficult, is not impossible, or at least not more difficult 
than other tasks monetary authorities have already been doing, such as estimating output 
potential and the EIR (Cecchetti et. al. 2000, 2003). Therefore, they suggest that 
monetary policy should 
 
“set interest rates both in response to projected inflation and, to some degree, in 
response to the extent of estimated misalignments in the asset markets (equities, housing 
and the exchange rate). This is the case even if the inflation projection itself makes use of 
information in asset prices.” (Cecchetti et. al., 2000: p. 51). 
 
The key to the above difference in opinions seems to be whether monetary authorities 
are able to identify asset price misalignments. To make life easier, we suppose they are, 
but ask two questions. First, how can monetary authorities correct asset price 
misalignments? Second, should monetary authorities bother to correct asset price 
misalignments—would not the task of keeping inflation on target already handle the 
“toxic side effects”? In light of the above insight about the EFAP determination, we 
address these two questions in the following.    - 40 - 
For illustration, based on the above model, we consider an economy state 
} , , : { i r q i
E in which AD and AS are balanced under the short-term interest rate (i) as 
a monetary policy instrument. Suppose the equilibrium capital price (q
E) is sustained by 
expected future capital incomes  ) (r too high to be reasonable, i.e., there are asset price 
bubbles. Then, how should monetary authorities handle such a situation? While the 
Opponents might suggest no more duties for monetary authorities since the AD-AS 
balance indicates the “toxic side effects” have already been rid off, the Proponents tend to 
suggest monetary authorities taking care of the bubbles.  
If monetary authorities follow the Proponents’ advice, what should they do? A 
common suggestion would be monetary tightening. Yet, how tight? Or what is the “right” 
level for asset prices? Apparently, monetary authorities need to have confidence in their 
own predictions over future capital incomes.  
Granted that monetary authorities know the future capital incomes; can monetary 
tightening really help correcting the misalignments? It can certainly bring down the 
inflated asset prices through a higher interest rate; yet, the lowered asset prices will still 
be bubbles as long as the  r  remain to be inconsistent with future fundamentals. In a 
word, changes in the interest rate per se cannot correct asset price misalignments due to 
non-rational expectations over future productivities.   
Monetary tightening might be able to help correcting  r through signaling the 
existence of bubbles. Or simply suppose monetary authorities can correct the non-rational 
r  by warning of irrational exuberance (i.e., the so-call “open mouth operations”); then 
the asset price bubbles would be deflated. However, asset prices lower than the original 
level (q
E) tend to cause an insufficient AD. To rebalance AD and AS, monetary   - 41 - 
authorities will have to lower i to reflate asset prices back to q
E. Then the economy 
reaches a desirable non-bubbles state with the AD-AS balance still maintained.  
Granted that such correction of asset price misalignments is achievable in reality, is it 
worthy—what is the difference between the non-bubbles state and the original bubble 
state? There is not much difference; even the original misaligned asset price level is 
unaltered after the correction. The only difference is that r  and the interest rate are both 
higher in the bubble state than in the non-bubbles one. In this sense, the Opponents’ 
argument is correct—with AD and AS in balance (in the original state), the “toxic side 
effects” of the bubbles in r  have already been handled (by a higher interest rate level 
than it would have been without the bubbles).  
The discussion so far seems to lend support to the Opponents’ suggestion of no direct 
monetary reaction to asset price movements under normal situations. However, Japan’s 
painful experience of “bubble” boom-bust in the 1980s makes asset price movements 
hard to be taken lightly.
  Asset price boom-bust cycles, when happened, are usually 
considered as caused by bubbles;
30, 31 and monetary authorities are sometimes blamed for 
not taking care of the bubbles timely.
32 In the following, we point out that fundamental 
factors, with the acquiescence of monetary policy that focuses on the current AD-AS 
balance, can also likely cause asset price boom-bust cycles,  
                                                 
30 Asset price boom-bust cycles are currently under intensive research— for example, see the articles in 
“Asset Price Bubbles: The Implications for Monetary, Regulatory, and International Policies” edited by 
William C. Hunter, George G. Kaufman, and Michael Pomerleano (2003).  
31 Asset price boom-bust cycles are usually studied under the perspective of “bubbles”.  As a rare 
exception, Borio and Lowe (2003) suggest posing the issue of asset price fluctuations not as bubble booms-
busts but as “financial imbalances” building up and unwinding. They also warn that the financial 
imbalances build-up in a low inflation environment could eventually cause financial instability and 
jeopardize real economic stability in the long run.  
32 For example, with the benefit of hindsight, the central bank of Japan was often criticized for allowing the 
1980s bubbles to develop in an easy-money environment. See Okina and Shiratsuka (2003) for discussion.    - 42 - 
Recall that the macroeconomic perspective indicates that the EFAP are closely tied to 
the current economic condition and behaviors. This is because asset prices have a close 
tie to AD through the wealth and Tobin’s q effects. If the relationship between asset 
prices and AD is stable, monetary policy that stabilizes AD will indirectly stabilize asset 
prices; and vice versa. However, asset price boom-bust cycles could happen if the 
relationship is not stable.  
For illustration, consider a (close-economy) case in which a positive shock on 
productivity growth increases the growth in the output (AS) potential. Suppose monetary 
policy keeps the AD and AS balanced in every period; then the increased growth in 
output potential needs to be balanced by an increase in the growth in AD, which will in 
turn need an increase in the growth of asset prices. In a word, the productivity growth 
shock tends to generate an asset price boom. We consider two different scenarios, 
respectively with and without a boom-bust cycle.  
In scenario A, suppose the relationship between asset prices and AD is stable and 
regular. Then, asset prices will grow gradually, keeping pace with the growth of AD, or 
ultimately, the growth of the output potential. Therefore, no boom-bust cycle tends to 
happen, as depicted by the asset price growth path A in Figure 1.  
However, in scenario B, suppose asset price appreciation has a delayed effect on 
AD—this could happen, for example, because initially consumers are yet to be convinced 
of a long-lasting boom.
33 Then, to induce enough AD to sustain the increased AS, the 
initial boom needs to be “inflated” relative to that in scenario A, as depicted by path B in 
                                                 
33 Consumers might be “target savers”, i.e., they change consumption behaviors only when wealth reaches 
targeted levels. In addition, besides the investment impediments discussed in the last section, investment 
uncertainty and irreversibility could make entrepreneurs adopt a “wait and see” strategy and hence prevent 
the Tobin’s q effect from stimulating the investment component of the AD at the beginning of the boom. 
See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for discussions on investment under uncertainty.    - 43 - 
Figure 1.  As the boom is gaining momentum, consumers might eventually be convinced 
of the “concreteness” of the wealth created by the booming asset prices and hence start 














wealth “created” by a relatively low consumption propensity will tend to vanish when the 
propensity becomes higher—recall the negative relationship between consumption 
propensity and the EFAP indicated in equation (29). In another word, a downward 
correction of asset prices is needed to align the excessive AD (due to the delayed wealth 
effect) to the potential AS. The correction process could be a “soft-landing”, as depicted 
by the portion cd on the path B. However, if the boom has been inflated too much; and/or 










Figure 1   - 44 - 
not mentioning a possible full-scale bust (the portion ef) due to financial panics that are 
likely induced by the correction. In the hindsight, such a boom-bust cycle tends to be 
taken as a case of bubbles boom-bust. Yet, the boom, despite eventually busted, is indeed 
fundamental under common criteria.
34 
This simple example indicates that the absence of non-fundamental elements is not 
sufficient to avoid asset price boom-bust cycles. It also indicates that (temporary) AD-AS 
balance might seemingly be a sign of healthy booms but could indeed be peace before a 
latent storm. Paper wealth accumulation due to rapid asset price appreciation, 
fundamental or not, contains potential inflation pressure. In the short run, the pressure 
might be absent because of economic agents’ delayed reactions to the wealth 
accumulated; or the present pressure might not be overt because of short-term nominal 
rigidities. Yet, high and increasing asset prices are always impending and accumulating 
pressures on the AD-AS balance, which tend to eventually manifest themselves and have 
to be released through a downward correction of asset prices. A severe correction, by 
itself or accompanied by possible financial panics, could result in the bust of a “healthy” 
boom, which could severely disrupt the real economy through the wealth, Tobin’s q, and 
various balance sheet effects. 
Since fundamental asset market performances consistent with the current economic 
stability, if let alone, could still jeopardize the economic stability in the future, monetary 
authorities need to be at least concerned about asset market performances beyond the 
                                                 
34 One may argue that the boom is not fundamental because rational economic agents should be able to 
expect that their irregular behaviors could cause the boom-bust cycle and hence avoid it. However, an 
individual agent, being a price-taker in asset markets, is not likely to have the “collective rationality” to 
take into account the effect on asset prices of her and her fellow agents’ behaviors—the effect of her own 
behaviors tends to be infinitesimal; yet she might not have enough information to predict other agents’ 
behaviors.     - 45 - 
goal of the present AD-AS balance. Admittedly, many practical factors need to be taken 
into consideration before monetary authorities decide whether to intervene in asset 
markets to preempt over inflation pressure;
35 yet, neither the inability in distinguishing 
between fundamental and non-fundamental, nor the absence of imminent inflation, 
should be taken as a priori argument against such intervention.   
 
Summary 
The concept and determination of the EFAP is inspected from the macroeconomic 
perspective. The inspection clarifies that 1) asset price movements driven by 
fundamentals could nonetheless cause misalignments to the EFAP and hence need 
monetary responses; 2) the link between future productivities and the EFAP tends to be 
slackened by the constraints of current economic conditions (especially the AS 
constraint) on the EFAP; and 3) fundamental asset market booms consistent with the 
current AD-AS balance might not be able to escape the fate of eventual collapse.  
Conceptually, the inspection suggests that, from the macroeconomic perspective, the 
soundness of asset market performances does not depend on whether they are 
fundamental or not. Rather, it depends on whether they are compatible with the AD-AS 
balance in the long run. Non-fundamental booms can be sustained as long as they are 
                                                 
35 Monetary intervention in asset markets to preempt over future inflation pressure faces several practical 
difficulties. First, it is hard to know the magnitude and timing of the pressure of current asset prices on 
future AD-AS balances—to predict future AS is difficult enough, let alone to estimate the effect of asset 
prices on AD. Thus, it is difficult to determine when to intervene and by how much. Second, markets by 
themselves might be able to release the potential pressure through a soft-landing correction; thus 
preemptive monetary intervention might not be necessary. Most importantly, preemptive monetary 
intervention to handle elusive future AD-AS imbalances tends to nevertheless cause the imbalance at 
present. Having considered these elements against the preemptive monetary intervention, the severity of 
damages on real economy caused by a bust suggests monetary authorities being less conservative in the 
preemptive intervention.     - 46 - 
consistent with the AD-AS balance; nevertheless, fundamental booms might not be 
sustainable when they are not.  
Practically, the inspection suggests monetary authorities viewing asset prices as a 
barometer for inflation pressure and watching out for unusual asset market booms.  
It is well recognized that asset prices contain information about inflation expectations. 
Yet, (high) asset prices, representing (mass) purchasing power potential, could be 
inflation pressure by themselves. The pressure could be latent in the short run, yet 
accumulating through asset price appreciation. However, the pressure tends to eventually 
manifest itself and might have to be released through a downward correction of asset 
prices. In the case of the appreciation being too rapid and too large, and the correction 
being too sudden and too severe, an asset price boom-bust cycle happens.  
It is worth stressing that such a cycle could happen even when the asset price 
appreciation is fundamentally driven by future productivities. Therefore, monetary 
authorities should always be concerned about rapid asset price appreciation, not for 
whether the appreciation is fundamental or not, but for the mass purchasing power 
potential it generates.  
To prevent asset market boom-bust cycles from disrupting the real economy, 
monetary preemption for curbing the booms might be wise. This certainly does not mean 
no booms are allowed or frequent interventions are needed. Rather, it means that 
monetary authorities need to help soft-landing an inflated boom,
36 even when it takes 
                                                 
36 Identifying inflated booms due to delayed inflation pressure is not as difficult as determining whether 
booms are fundamental—the U.S. late 1990s stock market booms could be fundamental, or not; yet, in light 
of the much more significant growth in wealth than that in output, more chances than not the booms are 
inflated.   - 47 - 
preemptive intervention that might slow the economy down and upset financial 
communities’ dream of everlasting booms.   
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper clarifies three conceptual issues regarding asset prices and monetary policy. 
First, FPW changes due to monetary policy are essentially wealth redistributions between 
current and future asset holders; and a FPW increase tends to make current consumers as 
a whole wealthier and hence consume more. Second, the more elastic investment is, the 
stronger the Tobin’s q effect (of monetary policy); yet the weaker the wealth effect. 
Third, from the macroeconomic perspective, the soundness of asset market performances 
does not depend on whether the performances are driven by fundamentals or others; 
rather, it depends on whether they are compatible with the AD-AS balance in the long 
run.  
These clarifications might be known to some readers in one way or another; yet, the 
apparent under-appreciation of them indicated by current discussions regarding asset 
prices and monetary policy convinces us of the worthiness of a formal articulation of 
them. 
The implications of the clarifications have been discussed in detail in respective 
previous sections. We conclude with a brief summary. 
The substance of wealth is the underlying incomes it represents, while the function of 
wealth is to provide purchasing powers. Monetary policy might not affect the substance; 
yet it does tend to affect the purchasing powers the substance can provide, which are   - 48 - 
what really matters for wealth holders. This is the rationale for the wealth effect of 
monetary policy.  
Monetary effect on asset prices and accordingly the wealth effect of monetary policy 
negatively depend on the Tobin’s q effect, which in turn positively depends on the q-
elasticity of investment. As the q-elasticity could be diminished by a variety of 
investment impediments, monetary policy tends to have non-trivial effects on asset 
prices. Thus, the wealth effect channel is potentially a significant monetary policy 
transmission mechanism; and the significance tends to be enhanced as stock ownership 
becomes increasingly popular. 
Monetary effect on asset prices makes monetary policy unable to simultaneously 
stabilize both goods and asset markets. Indeed, inflation-targeting monetary policy tends 
to make asset prices a buffer for economic fluctuations; in another word, monetary policy 
for stabilizing prices in goods markets tends to make asset prices more volatile.
37 This 
unpleasant feature does not negate the role of monetary policy as the most flexible and 
convenient AD policy for managing transitory shocks. Yet, it does indicate that monetary 
policy could acquiesce to the development of latent destabilizing elements in an inflation-
benign environment, such as excessive asset market booms that not only tends to crowd 
out savings but also might eventually collapse. 
Whether a boom is in danger of collapse does not depend on whether it is 
fundamental or bubble. Rather, it depends on whether the mass purchasing power 
potential generated by the boom is compatible with the AD-AS balance in the long run. 
Therefore, identifying bubbles is a non-issue for monetary policy. Rather, the issue is to 
                                                 
37 Certainly, inflation-targeting monetary policy, through anchoring inflation expectations, can reduce 
short-term asset price fluctuations around their long-term trends. Yet, it tends to enhance the volatility of 
the trends.     - 49 - 
identify inflated booms that contain latent inflation pressures, watch them vigilantly, and 
if necessary, help soft-landing them even when it takes preemptive interventions in asset 
markets per se.  
Financial communities might not like asset market booms being curbed by monetary 
interventions. Yet, the following clarifications might help mitigating the resentment. 
First, fundamental elements that affect asset prices also tend to influence the underlying 
interest rate. Thus, monetary responses to fundamentals-driven asset price movements 
tend to be endogenous monetary reactions to changes in the underlying interest rate. Such 
responses are not interventions; rather, lack of which is. Second, asset prices, 
fundamental or not, are intrinsically volatile. Asset market booms driven by fundamentals 
can also be excessive and eventually collapse for fundamental reasons. Thus, monetary 
preemption for deflating an excessive boom could help avoiding a bust. Third, monetary 
policy tends to affect assets’ paper value but not their underlying earnings. On the one 
hand, if the paper wealth created by an unusual boom has a significant influence over 
consumption in the near future, a preemptive monetary tightening appropriately helps to 
release the existing or potential inflation pressure mildly. On the other, if the paper 
wealth does not matter for consumption in the near future, a decline in assets’ paper value 
might not matter—after all, the substance of the assets is still intact. In this sense, 
monetary intervention in an unusual boom tends to be either necessary or harmless.   
Keynes in his General Theory (1936, p.235) pointed out that monetary authorities 
could pull economy out of stagnation by satisfying people’s desire for “the moon” (i.e., 
liquidity). During boom times people might want another moon, i.e., a vast amount of 
wealth that keeps growing. Monetary authorities can help satisfying this desire as long as   - 50 - 
people only take the wealth as such. Yet, when they become wealthy enough and ready to 
unleash the purchasing powers seemingly in the wealth, they will soon find out that paper 
wealth can vanish overnight. Monetary authorities cannot help—they have no magic to 
move goods and services yet to be produced in the future to the present. However, they 
do commit to protecting the purchasing powers in one kind of store of value (i.e. money). 
Thus, people need to decide whether to take the risks in (long-term) asset markets or not. 
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